Abstract: My op-ed argues that Canada’s credit system is no longer defined solely by banks, as private credit funds, fintech lenders and specialty finance firms now play a growing role in financing consumers, small businesses and real estate. The real policy challenge is not the existence of non-bank credit itself, but the fact that regulation and data systems have not kept pace with this shift. Drawing on Governor Tiff Macklem’s March 4, 2026 remarks about the growing importance and opacity of private credit, the piece contends that policymakers need better visibility into how credit is originated, funded and monitored across the broader ecosystem. The Nova Scotia consultation on implementing the Social Insurance Number Protection Act adds a practical example of this transition: governments are now being forced to balance privacy protection with the operational realities of identity verification and fraud prevention in a more fragmented lending market.
This week’s speech by the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Tiff Macklem, landed with an understated but important message. The architecture of Canada’s credit system is changing faster than the institutions that oversee it.
For decades, policymakers could treat banks as the centre of gravity of the financial system. If regulators understood the banks, they understood the system. That assumption no longer holds.
A growing share of credit now originates outside traditional banking institutions. Private credit funds, fintech lenders and specialty finance firms increasingly provide capital to small businesses, consumers and real estate projects. The shift is not unique to Canada. Across the developed world, non-bank lenders have moved from the periphery of finance to a central role in credit creation.
The problem, as Mr. Macklem observed, is that regulators can see far less of this system than they once could.
Private markets are opaque by design. Loans are not traded daily. Valuations are not constantly marked to market. Data is scattered across hundreds of firms rather than concentrated within a handful of banks. As a result, the growth of private credit has created a paradox for policymakers. The financial system may be more diversified than before, but it is also harder to measure.
This opacity has prompted warnings about “shadow banking”, a phrase that still carries the ghosts of the 2008 financial crisis. But the analogy is misleading.
Unlike the complex securitisation chains that helped fuel that crisis, much of today’s private credit is relatively straightforward lending. In Canada, non-bank lenders finance equipment purchases, merchant working capital, vehicle loans and small-business expansion. They serve segments of the economy that banks often approach cautiously or cannot reach efficiently.
In other words, the rise of private credit reflects not a malfunction of the system but a natural evolution of it.
Banks remain essential. But they are no longer the sole channel through which credit flows. The modern financial system increasingly resembles an ecosystem rather than a hierarchy, with banks, fintech lenders, private funds and institutional investors all participating in the allocation of capital.
That diversity brings benefits. When one channel tightens, another can often expand. During periods of economic stress, such diversification can actually make the system more resilient.
The risk lies elsewhere.
If regulators lack visibility into large parts of the credit system, they may struggle to detect emerging vulnerabilities. Leverage may accumulate in unexpected places. Fraud may migrate toward weaker identity infrastructure. Funding pressures in private markets could ripple outward during a downturn.
That concern is no longer theoretical. In Nova Scotia, Service Nova Scotia is currently consulting stakeholders on the planned 2026 implementation of the Social Insurance Number Protection Act, which was passed in fall 2025 after a major private-sector data breach. Unless permitted by regulation, the law would prohibit the collection of Social Insurance Numbers for commercial activities. The consultation is a reminder that policymakers are increasingly focused not only on where credit is flowing, but on how sensitive identity data is collected, verified and protected at the front door of the financial system. (Nova Scotia Legislature)
The answer is not to suppress private credit. Nor would it be wise to regulate fintech lenders as if they were deposit-taking banks. The better approach is to modernise the information architecture of the credit system itself.
Policymakers need better visibility into how credit is being originated, financed and distributed across the economy. That does not require heavy-handed supervision. It requires better data. It also requires rules that distinguish between unnecessary collection of sensitive identifiers and the legitimate need for secure, reliable identity verification in credit origination and fraud prevention. The Nova Scotia consultation highlights exactly this tension: privacy protection is essential, but so is ensuring that lenders have workable, modern tools to verify identity and detect fraud. (Nova Scotia Legislature)
Industry groups and regulators could work together to develop aggregated reporting on portfolio performance, delinquency trends and funding structures in non-bank lending. Improved identity verification standards could also help reduce the growing problem of synthetic identity fraud, which increasingly exploits the front door of the credit system.
In short, the challenge is informational rather than structural.
Canada’s financial system is no longer defined solely by its banks. It is defined by a broader network of institutions that collectively supply credit to the economy. The task for regulators is to ensure that they can see the system clearly enough to understand its risks.
Mr. Macklem’s speech was therefore less a warning than an invitation.
The era of bank-centric finance is quietly ending. The next phase of financial stability policy will depend on how effectively regulators learn to work with the lending ecosystem that replaces it.
A few useful facts to support that insertion: Bill 127 created the Social Insurance Number Protection Act, its purpose is to prevent unnecessary private-sector collection of SINs, and the law bars collection in commercial activities unless required by law or permitted by regulation. The legislation received Royal Assent in fall 2025, with implementation dependent on regulations. (Nova Scotia Legislature)
I can also tighten this into a sharper Economist-style version if you want it more publishable.
5 key insights
Canada has moved beyond a bank-centric credit model
Non-bank lenders and private credit are now an established part of the financial system, not a marginal side market.
The biggest risk is informational blind spots
As credit creation disperses beyond traditional banks, regulators have less direct visibility into leverage, funding pressures and emerging weaknesses.
Today’s private credit is not simply a replay of 2008-era shadow banking
Macklem’s remarks focus on the need to understand new players and old risks, rather than treating all non-bank lending as inherently toxic or crisis-driven.
Identity infrastructure is now part of financial stability policy
Nova Scotia’s planned implementation of the Social Insurance Number Protection Act, introduced through Bill 127 after a major private-sector data breach, shows that governments are actively reassessing how sensitive identifiers should be collected and used in commercial activity.
The policy answer is smarter data and verification standards, not blunt suppression of private credit
The op-ed’s core argument is that Canada needs modernized reporting, stronger visibility into non-bank lending, and better identity-verification frameworks so privacy protection and fraud prevention can coexist. This is an inference from the Bank of Canada’s emphasis on changing financial-system risks and the Nova Scotia government’s consultation on SIN restrictions.
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